INTRODUCTION
There appears to be a common belief amongst scholars of European economic integration that the latter proceeds as a result of private economic interests asking for the harmonisation of laws, regulations and standards in order to reduce the transaction costs associated with the movement of goods, services, capital and people across borders.
When integration does not proceed forward, it is because member state governments prevent it from doing so, often as a result of domestic private economic interests preferring to maintain existing obstacles to cross-border economic exchanges. The reality is, however, different. There are many instances where private economic interests were initially in favour of integration but where the attempt to create supranational legislation that would harmonise rules and standards across the EU ended up failing as a result of fierce lobbying by economic interests. It should be noted that integration failure takes place when the status quo remains. As such, it can take two forms: a direct and an indirect one. Direct integration failure occurs with the elimination of the proposed legislation.
1 Indirect integration failure takes place when the adopted legislation contains so many loopholes, opt-outs or acceptable standards that it formally recognises the status quo.
An example of the first case of integration failure is that of the Software Patent implemented into national law in May 2006, is that it contains many opt outs that greatly reduce its usefulness in fostering European economic integration. As such, it is generally considered a failure.
What do these examples of legislative failures mean for European integration and the theories that explain it? How can they be possible when, after all, business interests were originally supportive of the intent to harmonize standards and regulations in these fields as a way to promote further European economic integration? Such questions find no answers in existing theoretical approaches to regional integration. One reason for this situation may be because these approaches always assume that economic interests know clearly the benefits and costs of integration beforehand. But what happens if in fact they do not? How does it affect our understanding of European integration, both practically and theoretically? These are the questions that this paper seeks to answer.
It does so by examining the apparent paradoxical relationship between economic (especially business) interests and European integration, whereby supranational legislation in a given policy area can fail even though there is originally support from economic interests for integrating this policy area. If the EP and Council are responsive to the opinions of economic interests, this means that over time certain groups decide to oppose integration in the form of legislation proposed by the European Commission.
What causes this change of heart? The answer, this paper will argue, is to be found in the 3 See Commission of the European Communities (2002b).
initial fog (i.e. uncertainty) that surrounds EU integration proposals in terms of their costs and benefits for economic interests. But as the fog lifts and the terms of integration become more concrete, certain economic agents may realize that the proposed legislation that is on the table is not beneficial to their interests. Thus, they turn against it or lobby for amendments and exceptions, even if they initially supported integration in this particular policy area. If enough of these interests mobilize and lobby against the proposal, then it is likely to fail (directly or indirectly) at the EP and/or the Council.
This phenomenon may be more prevalent in reality than commonly presumed by scholars of European integration and lobbying, who usually assume that economic interests are fully cognisant of the net benefits or costs of integration in a given sector right from the start and, consequently, that they will readily share this information with uncertain policy-makers through lobbying activities. Although it is true that economic interests will share the information they possess in a given policy area, this does not mean
that they know what the costs and benefits of integration are or will be. These depend on the form that integration will take, i.e. which rules, regulations and standards will be part of the new supranational legislation. As a result, economic interests may support greater integration in principle but not promote it actively. Consequently, the actual impetus for integration may come more from a policy entrepreneur like the European Commission (Nugent 1995) .
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the weaknesses of the main theoretical approaches to the study of economic interests and regional integration. The subsequent section presents the argument regarding the relationship between economic interests and European integration under the assumption that there is initially a fair degree of uncertainty surrounding interests' cost-benefit calculations. The following two sections examine in detail the cases of the Software Patent and Takeover Directives, which are both integration failures but with different characteristics. The first one is an example of direct integration failure (i.e. no supranational legislation) whereas the second case is representative of cases of indirect integration failure (i.e. the formalisation of the status quo). 4 Moreover, the Software Directive case is representative of situations where economic interests are organised on a transnational basis while the case of the Takeover Directive is an example of instances where interests are organised nationally. As such, these two cases allow us to assess the merit of the argument as well as draw certain hypotheses for future research on EU integration. The final section concludes on the need of existing theories of European integration to revise their understanding of the role played by economic interests in European integration.
ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The main theories of European integration give a prominent place to the role that economic interests play in the process. For neofunctionalists, economic interests are proactively supportive of the successive integration of various sectors of the economy across borders (usually through the harmonisation of regulations and standards) as a way to overcome the increasing transaction costs that arise from the international exchange of goods, services, capital and people. For liberal intergovernmentalists, domestic economic interests determine the positions of the member states on a given policy issue, whose outcome is determined by states' bargaining amongst themselves.
In his study of regional economic integration, Mattli (1999) argues that the demand for integration comes from business interests that wish to reduce the transaction costs associated with cross-border trade. Transaction costs arise because of such obstacles as tariffs, quotas, different standards and regulations, different languages and cultures, etc. (see Mattli 1999: 47) . Consequently, firms lobby for a new governance structure that fosters market integration (Mattli 1999: 49) . This new 'governance structure' may include (over time) such things as 'common trade rules, common industrial standards, tax harmonisation, macroeconomic policy coordination and common social policies' (49).
Even if Mattli's 'transaction-cost' approach is based on new institutional economics (North 1990; Williamson 1985) , it can easily be compared to neofunctionalism (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963) . One of the key building blocks of neofunctionalism is the concept of functional spillover, whereby the integration of particular economic sectors across countries creates pressures for integration in related sectors (so as to reduce transaction costs and, thereby, increase economic exchanges across borders). These pressures originate from economic interests that are adapting and benefiting from policy areas that are already integrated. This process is complemented by another parallel one: political spillover. In the latter, socio-economic interests transfer their loyalties and activities to the supranational level because they realise that this is where they can best achieve their objectives. In turn, this political spillover leads to greater functional spillover. In this ratcheting-up process, regional integration becomes almost irreversible, not to say teleological.
One important difference between Mattli's approach to regional integration and neofunctionalism's lies in the role given to supranational institutions. According to neofunctionalism, such institutions (or higher authorities) are key drivers (sponsors and guides) of integration, as long as they have some degree of autonomy. According to Mattli, supranational institutions are much weaker drivers of integration; the regional leader (or hegemon) is key to the supply of integration. The implicit recognition here is that states are the suppliers of integration. As such, they also have the ability to slowdown or stop integration (see also Hoffmann 1966) . Moravcsik (1993 Moravcsik ( , 1998 Clausewitz's term, can arise to produce a less than optimal outcome. This uncertainty is readily recognised with regards to governments and supranational institutions but not in the case of economic interests. As the bearers of knowledge and information, the latter are generally seen as crucial elements in explaining regional economic integration.
However, if economic interests are uncertain about their payoffs regarding a certain integration policy outcome, they are unlikely to lobby actively in favour or against it, either at the national and/or supranational level. Only once there is a legislative proposal on the table will interest groups mobilize one way or the other. As a result, their role in giving integration's initial impetus may be less prominent than proponents of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism would have us believe.
The case of European Monetary Union (EMU) is illustrative. Although business interests and banks were generally in favour of a common currency, they did not lobby for it (Grossman 2002; Leblond 2004; McNamara 1998 McNamara , 1999 . They supported it but did not actively push for it. In fact, although they could anticipate benefits from EMU, they could not assess their level (Verdun 2000) . The same applied to the costs of EMU. Only once concrete legislative proposals were on the table, could economic interests begin their calculations. Until then, the ambiguity caused them to act as mere 'cheerleaders' rather robustly active players. This is why there were keen to obtain the political and legislative details of EMU from the Commission and the Council (Leblond 2004) . The uncertainty regarding the net benefits of monetary integration made it difficult to lobby for or against it (McNamara 1999). Support was positive but only with respect to the principle of a single currency. The fact that policy issues are often not well understood from the start makes it difficult for economic interests to devise specific strategies and lines of action (Grossman 2004) . It is only when the fog (uncertainty) recedes that economic interests can decide on a specific course of action (e.g., lobby for or against a proposed legislation).
The absence of lobbying or pressures by economic interests does not mean that integration cannot take place. It just leaves a greater role for states and supranational institutions to play in the process, especially as initiators of integration. In the case of EMU, for example, France, Italy and Germany put EMU back on the European table (Gros and Thygesen 1992) . However, the European Commission and a group of experts known as the Delors Committee also played a prominent role in moving European monetary integration forward towards the Maastricht Treaty (Jabko 1999; Verdun 1999 ).
Then, the Commission and the European Monetary Institute ensured that EMU would indeed become a reality by completing the (incomplete) contract signed in Maastricht (Leblond 2004 ).
How does the fog or uncertainty that surrounds economic interests at the beginning of the integration process affect our understanding of the process of regional economic integration, especially if we continue to assume that economic interests have an important role in the process? For one, it highlights the importance that states and supranational institutions have in the process. This does not mean, however, that economic interests are not important players in the process. Without their support for integration (in principle) at the beginning of the process (in a given policy area), then it is doubtful that member states and/or the Commission would initiate it in the first place.
Once they are able to calculate the costs and benefits of integration, economic interests will indeed play a determinant role in the outcome of the integration process (as defined by the existence of a body of supranational laws and regulations), as many analysts of the EU's policy-making process have now been arguing for over a decade (see inter alia Andersen and Eliassen 1991; Coen 1997; Greenwood et al. 1992; Mazey and Richardson 1993) . In fact, the relationship between European integration and economic interests may be more dynamic than traditional theories of integration tend to argue. Such an approach would help rescue neofunctionalism in its inability to explain the absence or limited degree of integration in certain policy areas (Hass 1976) . Economic interests may be rhetorically behind functional and political spillovers in principle -owing to the uncertainty of the costs and benefits of integration -but may end up backtracking in practice when an integrative piece of supranational legislation is tabled by the Commission if the net benefits of integration are negative.
THE ARGUMENT: UNCERTAINTY, LOBBYING AND THE ROLES THAT ECONOMIC INTERESTS PLAY IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
So far, integration theories tell us that economic interests are often frustrated with the status quo of national rules, regulations and standards because they make international economic exchanges more costly than if borders did not exist. As a result, these interests are very supportive of any attempt to harmonize these rules, regulations and standards across-borders (i.e. integration). It does not necessarily mean, however, that they will be proactive in their support, in terms of lobbying governments or supranational institutions to integrate a given policy area. This is because these economic interests may not be clear about the costs and benefits of integration. It is possible that the harmonized rules or standards may require a lot of adaptation (i.e. be costly). The proposed rules may also give a competitor a clear competitive advantage. So spending a lot of money and energy on lobbying for integration may be very costly while providing little or no net benefits.
Furthermore, integration as a principle or general concept can be considered a sort of public good for economic interests, whereby lobbying by one firm or group allows other firms and groups to do nothing and free ride. Consequently, no firm or group has any incentive to actively lobby in favour of integration. Claiming support for integration is sufficient. Public and private statements of support can be made, but little more. The burden of initiating the process of integration really lies with governments and/or supranational institutions.
Once the integration (harmonisation) process has been initiated and concrete proposals for legislation begin to emerge, then economic interests are in a better position to calculate the costs and benefits of harmonisation as the initial fog or uncertainty of integration is being lifted by states and/or supranational institutions. In the case of the EU, the Commission is responsible for proposing legislation on a given policy issue, which has been accepted for integration by the member states. This does not mean, however, that the Commission drafts legislation in a vacuum. As many students of the EU have observed, the Commission does not hesitate to consult various organised interests to gather information and expertise at the drafting stage (Bouwen 2002; Coen 1997; Greenwood et al. 1992; Mazey and Richardson 1993) . But here economic interests are not lobbying in favour of a certain position but are rather providing information and expertise requested by the Commission. As Bouwen (2002) and Coen (1997) note, the Commission needs expert knowledge as a result of insufficient resources and expertise but it also requires that the advice it receives not be in the self-interest of those providing it; otherwise, it is likely to limit the access it grants to those information providers.
The Commission will not be successful in pushing through a given legislation at the EP and the Council if it does not have the support of economic interests. The challenge for the Commission is to maintain the original support from a large majority of economic interests as the uncertainty regarding the costs and benefits of integration disappears. Drezner (2005) indicates that the expected additional profit (i.e. the benefit) arising from integration (or harmonisation) is a function of the relative size of the market to which the firm (or economic interests) will now have an easier access. For its part, the adjustment cost is a function of the 'distance' between the pre-existing regulatory standards in various member states. This distance could be purely technical but it could also be more fundamental, i. (Leblond 2006) . As we will see below, the same thing happened in the case of the Takeover Directive.
In sum, it is possible for economic interest to support integration right from the beginning even though they do not know on what basis harmonisation would take place and there is a risk that the adopted standard strays too far from the standard under which they are currently operating, whereby they would face a net cost from integration. Firms can afford to take this risk because they know that they always have the possibility to lobby the EP and the Council down the road against a non-advantageous legislation being proposed by the Commission. For the Commission, it is important to consult firms (i.e.
economic interests) early in the process in order to assess their support for integration in a given policy area and obtain information regarding their potential payoffs from standards harmonisation so that it may choose the most appropriate legislation to foster integration.
If support is not forthcoming, then the Commission need not go any further with its intention to integrate a certain policy domain.
Even if economic interests are supportive of European integration, it does not necessarily mean that they will lobby in its favour. Some might not lobby at all. Others might lobby against integration. The present section has argued that there are situations where integration may fail as a result of lobbying by economic interests. This may seem paradoxical on the part of economic interests but as the fog of integration lifts, the calculus of economic interests changes. The ability to determine more precisely the benefits and costs of harmonising standards, rules or regulations will lead economic interests to decide whether to lobby (for or against) or not with respect to a proposed legislation by the Commission. The structure of this lobbying will likely determine the integration outcome. The next sections examine two cases of failed European integration to assess the validity of the argument presented so far.
TO PATENT OR NOT TO PATENT: THE CASE OF THE COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED INVENTIONS DIRECTIVE
The case of the Computer Implemented Inventions Directive -better known as the so- This is because software companies would develop and sell their products only in jurisdictions where they found high patent protection from local courts.
At the time, the jurisprudence related to 'computer-implemented inventions' had been developed by courts in Germany and the United Kingdom only. In the UK, software (i.e. a computer programme) that corresponds to a method of doing business (e.g., ecommerce) or performing a mental act (e.g., some mathematical calculation) was considered unpatentable even if there was a 'technical contribution' (a term subject to interpretation and key to the Commission's proposed directive). 5 Instead, such programmes are protected by existing copyright laws, where the written code and instructions' manual cannot be copied without authorisation from the copyright holder. In Germany, however, the jurisprudence did not exclude the possibility that business methods could be patentable. This means that the scope of patent protection in Germany was much larger than in the UK. The result was that a piece of software could be protected in Germany but not in the UK. Clearly, this contravened the EU's principle of the free movement of goods. requirement for a computer programme to provide a technical contribution in order to be patented. This means that patenting business methods is acceptable in the US. The fear with such an approach is that it stifles competition, innovation in information technology and, most especially, the development of new business methods like e-commerce. 'By codifying the requirement for a technical contribution, the Directive should ensure that patents for "pure" business methods or more generally social processes will not be granted because they do not meet the strict criteria, including the need for technical In terms of the argument presented in the previous section, the Software Patent Directive case is akin to the situation where only two opposite standards are available:
patents vs. no patents. Both groups initially supported the idea of harmonising EU standards in this area; however, they differed as to how much harmonisation should take place. Large software firms and intellectual property professionals supported patents and the Europe-wide harmonisation of the rules applicable to them with respect to software.
Small software developers and many individual users were in favour of harmonisation across the EU but saw an opportunity to limit the patentability of software programmes.
In the first case, large firms use patents defensively as bargaining chips when they collaborate in order to make their software programmes compatible with each other.
Otherwise, they have to pay licensing fees to other manufacturers. So they argue that an absence of patent protection would reduce the incentive for innovation and new products.
In the second case, SMEs claim that patents, which are costly to obtain, prevent them from competing against larger software manufacturers. Consequently, they are not in a position to negotiate with larger manufacturers. They lack bargaining chips. This is why they are fervent supporters of open-source software, which is made fully available to the public for interoperability at no cost. In such a world, there is no market protection. Any software developer is able to successfully enter the market simply by devising a programme that is compatible with other existing programmes and, therefore, that can be marketed on its own merits. As such, copyright protection of the programme itself is sufficient.
The Commission proposed a directive favouring patents, which was accepted by large software manufacturers but rejected by small software developers and individual users. Because their competitive advantage was at stake one way or another, both groups lobbied forcefully for its position. Although financially less resourceful than the multinational firms, small software developers and users nevertheless managed to mount an effective lobbying campaign with the EP, framing the debate in terms of David against Goliath. Initially, the larger, multinational firms most probably thought that they could muster greater lobbying resources than the smaller firms, which is why they did not hesitate to lobby in favour of the Commission's proposal, especially with the member states to influence the Council's decision. As Bouwen (2002 Bouwen ( , 2004 argues, however, the EP has a greater demand for information about European encompassing interest than expert knowledge (which the Commission demands) or even domestic encompassing interest (which is more relevant to the Council). 9 As such, although the alliance of large software manufacturers was probably better at providing the Commission with expert knowledge and the Council with national encompassing interest (especially in countries where such firms have important operations), it found it much more difficult to provide the EP with high-quality information about European encompassing interest than small firms and the European association of consumers (BEUC) could.
In sum, the Software Patent Directive case is a good illustration of a situation where integration was clearly considered to be a good thing given the various national patent regulations in place across the EU, which represented an obstacle to the free movement of software programmes and the goods that use them. Not only did this limit competition, it also reduced innovation. Therefore, the Commission felt fully justified in proposing a directive that would harmonise the patentability of computer-implemented innovation across the entire EU. The reason why this attempt at integration failed is that private economic interests had different views as to what should be patentable or not.
Large firms wanted more protection (i.e. wider applicability of patents) in order to maintain their existing competitive advantage, whereby patents were used as bargaining chips in making software programmes compatible across firms. For large multinational software manufacturers, it was important to also limit the gap between European patent rules for software and those of the United States, which had a permissible system of patenting software programmes. For their part, smaller firms and end users preferred a much more open system where the level of patent protection was very low. This would make it easier for them to compete with the large software manufacturers, especially in the key European market. In the end, the proponents of less protection won the day by gaining the EP's support, which caused the proposed directive to fail (i.e. be abandoned) and the status quo (i.e. national patent regulations) to remain. pressure the automaker to save local jobs rather than cut costs to maximise profits. As a result, it would want VW to fight any attempt by a foreign firm to take it over and force it to manage with the goal of maximising profits. VW was able to use its close links with the social democrats, which happened to be in power at the time, to influence the German government's position on the issue in its favour. as well as transfers of securities during the period for acceptance of the bid but did not, however, limit the existence of shares with multiple voting rights. 14 The German position was clear: either the Takeover Directive rules out all takeover defence mechanisms or it rules out none.
EVERYTHING GOES: THE CASE OF THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE
Given the fact that German opposition to the earlier proposed legislation had been successful, it was impossible for the Commission to ignore the German government's request for including multiple voting rights in article 11. Amending the draft directive in such a way, however, faced strong opposition from France and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), which had supported the previous version of the directive (Callaghan and Höpner 2005: 311 After many months of wrangling, the Takeover Directive was adopted by the Council and the EP in a highly watered-down compromise that allowed member states to opt out of the neutrality (of management) rule (article 9) and the breakthrough rule (article 11). Everybody thought a deal was better than no deal at all given the amount of time that had passed since the Commission's first proposal in the late 1980s (Financial Times, 24 November 2003) . 17 But the end result is pretty much the same as if the EU had not adopted the Takeover Directive given the number of member states that have taken advantage of the opt-outs (Sagayam 2006) .
The case of the Takeover Directive is a good example of how the fog of integration causes private economic interests to be initially supportive of harmonising national regulations and standards in order to improve cross-border commercial exchanges. However, once the Commission tables a proposition, then interests tend to polarize. Contrary to the Software Patent Directive, where the division was between large firms and smaller ones (along with consumers) on a transnational basis, the Takeover Directive saw business interests divide themselves on the basis of nationality. As a result, lobbying was most intense at the national level. Even MEPs tended to vote on the basis of nationality rather than party affiliation (Callaghan and Höpner 2005) . In the end, the Commission was faced with the choice of seeing its proposition -which aimed at truly harmonising the regulation of takeovers in the EU by restricting the use of defence mechanisms -defeated by the EP and the Council in favour of a compromised solution that more or less recognised the status quo or withdrawing it in favour of the status quo.
After so many years, it was considered that the cost of starting from scratch again would be too costly. It was better to try to build on the existing directive, which had to be revised after five years.
CONCLUSION
Scholars of European integration in particular and regional economic integration in general have argued that private economic interests have an important role in the integration process. Usually, this role is a positive one. The argument is that such interests desire more cross-border economic exchanges but face important transaction costs as a result of differentiated national laws, regulations and standards; consequently, they ask their respective governments to get together and harmonise these rules for conducting business (i.e. integrate various policy areas). Depending on the theoretical approach, this integration process can take either a transnational/supranational form or a national/intergovernmental one.
In fact, private economic interests' initial support for integration does not always result in integration actually taking place, as the cases of the Software Patent and
Takeover Directives presented herein demonstrate. On any process to integrate a given policy area, there may be interests that are bound to lose out in terms of facing greater costs to adjust to the new harmonised rules or standards. Consequently, they are likely to lobby for amending the proposed rules, if not abandoning them altogether. This lobbying is likely to take place at the EP and the Council since the fog of integration lifts only once the Commission has tabled a draft piece of legislation. Only then can interests groups assess where they stand with respect to integration and how they will respond to integration efforts. Hence, the ultimate outcome depends on the adjustment and lobbying costs of both sides relative to the benefits that they are likely to obtain from integration.
This means that the role of private economic interests in the integration process is not as straightforward as traditionally understood by scholars of regional economic and European integration. Private economic interests can, under certain circumstances, slow down or prevent integration from progressing forward. This is something that students of European politics and public policy have long understood and was made clear by Hix (1994) more than ten years ago. The time has now come to try to combine these different approaches and foci into a more coherent theoretical framework for understanding regional integration in general and European integration in particular. Maybe theories of public policy making in the EU can finally provide the missing link between neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism.
The two cases examined in this chapter show the way for fruitful research agenda for the future. For instance, they help us derive two hypotheses: (1) we are likely to see no integration take place at all (i.e. no supranational legislation) when private economic interests polarize transnationally on a given policy issue; (2) we are likely to see only the formalisation of the status quo in form of supranational legislation that allows opt-outs or the mutual recognition of existing national rules and standards when interests polarise on a national basis. Another example lies with the Takeover Directive, which does not really push integration forward even if it was adopted. This suggests that in many policy areas where there exists European legislation the degree of integration may be more formal than substantial. Therefore, analysing and explaining the varying depth of European integration across policy areas should also be an important part of this new research agenda on regional integration. After all, maybe the EU is not as integrated as we think.
In the same vein, maybe North America is more integrated than we think. If so, we need to know why and existing theories of regional economic integration are currently unable to offer us the answer.
